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Abstract

Journalism, understood as the discipline of news, has been defined in many ways. The hegemonic western model of journalism, which has dominated normative discussions for the past century, derives from a set of relationships and practices formed around relatively monopolistic daily newspapers and wire services at the end of the 19th century. This model assumes that news organizations are relatively autonomous from the state and that individual journalists are independent agents engaged in an agonistic relationship to power while representing the people by, among other things, giving expert accounts of affairs of public importance. It assumes that journalists' capacity for independence is provided by the media organizations that employ them. This model of journalism never described more than a sector of the news environment, especially outside the West. At the end of the 20th century, its usefulness in the West diminished with the erosion of the bottlenecks that had enabled some news organizations to acquire significant autonomous power, and with the rise of a new news environment with new news practices. These changes have opened the possibility of the redefinition of journalism, along with a rethinking of the relationship between journalism and democracy.

Keywords

journalism, objectivity, professionalization, western hegemony

Journalism as the discipline of news

In much of the commentary on the state of journalism, no consistent distinction is made between journalism and news. This reflects ordinary usage. But there is a distinction, and it should be made more commonly in scholarship.

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Journalism is an ism (Nerone, 2009a). That is, it is a belief system. In particular, it is the belief system that defines the appropriate practices and values of news professionals, news media, and news systems. All societies have some sort of news system, because any society requires a mechanism for monitoring change and deviance. But only some societies, and in particular modern societies, feature journalism as a discipline governing parts of their news system: I say parts because any form of journalism will distinguish news that falls under its discipline from other forms of news. In the modern era, for instance, journalism has designated its 'other' in various ways as gossip, tabloid news, sensationalism, partisanism, and so forth. It does not deny that these are news practices, but it does question whether these are journalism.

A hegemonic model of journalism appeared in the West in the late 19th and early 20th century. It was modeled in different ways in different nations, but had a truly international existence. It was exported to the developing world along with many other western beliefs and practices. Some places and movements produced counter-hegemonic models to challenge it. And now we might argue that this hegemonic western journalism is in its twilight.

The historical roots of the journalism of the modern West

There are many accounts of the rise of journalism. Mostly they assemble a common set of agencies, though they emphasize different ones as being primary. For the sake of discussion, we can identify two families of accounts, one emphasizing politics and the public sphere, the other emphasizing the marketplace. In both families, journalism proper is a fact-based discipline that is independent of other institutions and has something to do with self-government.

Accounts that emphasize the political see journalism as a cause and product of the age of bourgeois revolution. This reflects the early usage of the word journalism and its cognates in French and German as referring to polemic – its dominant usage from the French Revolution to the Industrial Revolution, when it came to refer to news in the modern sense of the word. In these accounts, journalism appeared because the political became public (Chalaby, 1998). In older liberal accounts, this was a simple narrative of the rise of freedom, told as a Whig story of the inevitable contest of power versus liberty, and measured by the formulation of the right of freedom of the press in the constitutions of the new bourgeois states (For the USA, the key Whig histories include Bleyer, 1927; Emery et al., 1954; Mott, 1962).

Some histories in this vein troubled the narrative by pointing to ironies in the appearance of press freedom or the limits and contradictions in liberal societies. Frederick Siebert (1952) noted that governments relaxed press regulation only when intra-elite conflicts made control impractical. Others noted that canonical thinkers like John Milton and Thomas Jefferson were not willing to tolerate expression of ideas they disliked or disagreed with (Fish, 1994; Illo, 1988; Levy, 1985). Such histories questioned the continuity of the ideological tradition that Whig histories saw as the driving force behind the development of independent journalism. Still, this line of historiography saw the political history of liberal societies as the key context for the history of journalism.

One influential formulation of this account was the schema proposed by the book *Four Theories of the Press* (Siebert et al., 1956). As its title suggests, the book was structured around a static typology of theories (authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility, and Soviet communist). But within the treatment of each theory, and across the various theories, *Four Theories* incorporated a commonsense history of the rise of 'libertarianism' in the face of 'authoritarian' systems that corresponds to the Whig tradition. Later scholarship troubled this schema in many ways (Christians et al., 2009; Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Nerone et al., 1995) but did not dislodge it from university syllabi. In fact, it has experienced a revival with the collapse of the Soviet bloc.

A more critical tradition, still within the family of political accounts but with a tragic rather than romantic emplotment, derives from Habermas's (1989) influential recounting of the rise of the bourgeois public sphere. In Habermas's account, social transformation produced an opening between civil society and the state, and this public sphere became the space in which citizens monitored their government and deliberated on its direction. As both a buffer zone and a steering mechanism, the public sphere became a place for journalism. Newspapers, which had earlier been only about commerce and only aimed at a mercantile class, became political organs as a result of the rise of the public sphere. Habermasian accounts emphasize the potential for strong democracy through public deliberation in the media sphere, but see that potential as tragically squandered in the capture of the media by first the marketplace and then industrial capitalism as the 19th century yielded to the 20th.

Where this line of accounts sees journalism as a creature of politics, a different tradition of press historiography emphasizes the market as the driving force behind the rise of journalism. To some extent, this tradition overlaps with the Habermasian or critical account of the political origin of journalism. However, market accounts look to the 19th century rather than the 18th as the pivotal moment. According to Schiller (1979) and Schudson (1978), who differ on the specifics of the process, class reconfigurations and market conditions encouraged the rise of a culture of news that emphasized political neutrality and something like objectivity. Chalaby (1998) likewise points to market forces as key in his book *The Invention of Journalism*. Another common theme in such accounts is the defining role of technology. An important set of studies emphasizes the role of the telegraph and telegraphic news agencies in the development of modern styles of reporting (Blondheim, 1994; Carey, 2009; Rantanen, 2009).

In most western countries, these politics-based and market-based accounts are not hard to reconcile. One might say that they refer to two different moments or two different lines of force in the development of news culture. Journalism historians have traditionally had a tendency to refer to them as successive stages of development, but that is not accurate. Rather, they should be seen as overlapping and simultaneous elements of the complex network of relationships that comprise news media. As Kevin Barnhurst and I (2001, 2003) describe it, an early partisan form of news culture emphasizing the editor as the key journalist developed, then was enveloped by a different news culture emphasizing the reporter as a news gatherer. This terse account elides many variations. Paths of development were inflected by numerous local factors, like the presence or absence of systems of censorship, the importance of class formations in the political system, the relative weight of a national capital and its newspapers, and the importance of commercial advertising for

the news system as a whole. But in most nations of the modern West, news culture was formed at the intersection of politics and the marketplace.

One could call either party papers run by editors or commercial newspapers filled with reporters' stories 'journalism', but neither one really resembles what journalism has meant in recent years. The editor's version of journalism involved polemics, usually in the service of a party organization. The reporter's version involved the stenographic recording of things done and said. Neither news practice corresponds to the active investigation and verification and the disciplines of observation and balance that are so firmly associated with normative professional journalism. Reportorial copy is more commonly invoked as the ancestor of journalism, but a quick tour of 19th-century news reveals a landscape quite foreign to the modern journalist. Reporters rarely exercised professional judgment, and routinely produced verbose and unfiltered accounts that moved from beginning to end, the way ordinary people tell stories. Journalists, on the other hand, start with the point of a story, and move through the account from the end to the beginning, emphasizing the elements that they determine are most important. The rise of this type of journalism rested on a set of occupational, institutional, and intellectual developments that began in the second half of the 19th century and culminated in the early 20th.

Occupationally, the key set of changes involved the struggles of news workers to gain greater autonomy and prestige. They did this in the face of the contrary economic interests of news owners and managers. In the granular details of the workplace struggles of news workers, new practices and new explanations of these practices produced new norms.

At the middle of the 19th century, editors supervised two sorts of news workers. The older of the two was the 'correspondent'. Correspondents had been present in newspapers from very early on. They were letter-writers, just as the name implies, independent writers who sent usually lengthy accounts of what was being said and done in some distant place, often a national capital. A correspondent's article had a voice and usually a name; a correspondent was an author with a personality. 'Reporters', on the other hand, worked as fact gatherers, collecting prices at the stock exchanges, lists of incoming ships in port cities, lists of hotel guests, and terse though sometimes humorous or sensational accounts of the action at police courts. If the key function of the correspondent was to actively observe at a distant scene, the key function of the reporter was to gather facts in as impersonal a fashion as possible (Nerone and Barnhurst, 2003).

Toward the end of the 19th century, the large differences between reporters and correspondents came to be bridged. This is part of the story of the genesis of what came to be called journalism, and seems to have occurred in most western countries, though again with many variations. Ironically, the merging of the tasks of the reporter and the correspondent seemed to occur first in what we would call 'soft news', like cultural news and sports, and only later in 'hard' news about politics and the economy. These soft news pages were and are more open to innovation. Driving the new set of tasks and norms for news workers was a set of workplace changes that were rooted in new economic conditions, new technologies, and new modes of production.

New conditions produced economies of scale that resulted in aspects of monopoly in the news system. Among these conditions were the rise of advertising, the lowering of material and transportation costs, and the expansion of hinterlands, which made it

advantageous for successful newspapers to produce larger and larger print runs, and made it more difficult for newspapers with lower circulations to remain viable (Kaplan, 1995). These tendencies toward the consolidation of news markets were intensified by the rise of collective newsgathering through the telegraph (Blondheim, 1994; John, 2010). National and international wire services became monopolies and claimed to be natural monopolies. At the same time, the newspapers that purchased wire service copy became less distinctive – another anti-competitive factor. By the 1920s, local newspaper markets in the most developed countries had become something like natural monopolies as well. One effect of these institutional changes was to make it possible for the first time for a society to produce a fairly standard version of ‘the news of the day’. This was true even in countries where a vibrantly competitive national press dominated the news system.

Nevertheless, there were many actors who challenged the fairness of what was presented as the news of the day. As the apparent power of the press and the (mostly) men who owned it grew, popular criticism also rose (Lawson, 1993; McChesney and Scott, 2004). This kind of criticism reached a crescendo following the First World War, during which nationally coordinated propaganda campaigns (Lasswell, 1927) and new visual media demonstrated the effectiveness of media power. The aftermath of the First World War included a broad intellectual crisis of confidence in the ability of democratic publics to operate with real intelligence (Lippmann, 1922; Lippmann and Merz, 1920).

The news industry responded to these criticisms by embracing a professionalization project. This project promised that journalists would have the capacity as independent and autonomous professionals to overcome the biases inherent in both the untrained cognitive machinery of ordinary humans and in the interested industrial machinery of the press as a big business. One index of the progress of the professionalization project was the growth of journalism schools worldwide. Journalism education in universities appeared as scattered courses in the later 19th century, and by the first decade of the 20th century full blown departments and schools of journalism appeared in the USA and elsewhere. Another index was the appearance of professional organizations for journalists, whether patterned on the upper-middle-class societies of physicians and lawyers or on the unionism of skilled or industrial workers.

The professionalization project was a kind of brokered settlement among three interested parties: news workers, media owners, and the public. Each got something and each gave up something. News workers got some measure of autonomy in their work and some increase in income to go with it. Owners agreed to let the norms of journalism occasionally trump concerns for maximizing profit in order to quiet the public criticism of the power of the media and to stave off gathering movements to regulate newspaper ownership or wire service conduct. And the public agreed to put aside more radical solutions while accepting the promise that news owners would allow their journalists to exercise independent professional judgment in providing an ‘objective’ account of the news of the day. As we have seen, the very structure that generated the power of the media and that provoked the public’s anxiety also provided the kind of control and authority that let journalists exercise something like professional expertise in determining the news of the day. Journalists could be the gatekeepers because the industrial structure of the media had built gates.

It is only at this point that we can speak of modern journalism as something real. That is to say, it was only about a hundred years ago that the occupation of journalist as an independent public-spirited verifier of factual information was recognized as the super-ego of the news industry. Older 'journalisms', including partisan and sensational journalism, continued to exist, of course, but these were cast as the crude 'other' to proper journalism. Variations of hegemonic journalism were crafted, including 'the social responsibility theory of the press' (Peterson, in Siebert et al., 1956; Commission on Freedom of the Press, 1947), 'public' or 'civic' journalism (Glasser, 1999; Rosen, 1999), and the three models of media systems that Hallin and Mancini (2004) have identified in Western Europe and the North Atlantic.

Journalism exported to the world

Western models of news followed western commerce and empire. Newspapers were established throughout the British Empire, for instance, both for the overseas British bureaucrats and businessmen and for local elites. In many places, such newspapers offer interesting examples of the interaction of local and imperial traditions. Every colonized society already had its news system, and in many cases metropolitan news practices were appropriated by local elites to modify the local news system for conscious political reasons. Such was the case in China, where liberal reformers created Chinese language newspapers as part of a movement for national revival. Hegemonic journalism, unlike the broader terrain of news practices, was a targeted export.

One of the virtues of professional journalism was that it was eminently teachable. It did not rely on vague or unusual capacities like 'news instinct' or the ability to pen a gripping narrative. Still, many have questioned whether what was taught was anything more than a set of gestures or rituals (Tuchman, 1978). A cynic could draw a parallel between the professionalization of journalism at the beginning of the 20th century and the professionalization of medicine at the beginning of the 19th century. Medical doctors acquired professional power at a time when they didn't really know, for instance, that microbes caused illnesses, that hands had to be washed before surgery, and that mercury-based medications were poisonous. What passed for 'science' in journalism curricula – the practices of objectivity – came to be viewed with equal suspicion. But the professionalization project – in medicine or in journalism – did not really depend on science or expertise, although that was its justification. It was grounded instead in the existence of social power.

In the beginning of the 20th century developing nations had already begun to import western journalism. In some places this happened when students from abroad attended western journalism schools – in the USA, for instance, the earliest important schools, like Missouri, Columbia, and Michigan, accepted students from places like Japan and China, who then returned and wrote textbooks, started newspapers, or founded journalism schools.

These episodic exports became a concerted effort during the Second World War era. Working through international institutions like the new United Nations, through private organizations like the international wire services (Cooper, 1956), through non-governmental organizations like Freedom House, and through national governmental efforts, modern

journalism was presented to the world as a one-size-fits-all trigger for market expansion and democratization. In some cases, as in West Germany, Japan, and South Korea, occupying forces after the Second World War created media systems that operated on liberal principles (Blanchard, 1986; Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Schiller, 1976).

Stupid normativity

It has always seemed obvious to many that the export of western journalism was an exercise in ‘stupid normativity’, a term Paolo Mancini has used to describe the inappropriate application of western standards to other social and media systems (2008). The norms of western journalism developed to mediate the conditions of western news media and news workers. This is to say, they made some sense in situations in which industrialized news media providers sold news to middling class audiences in political systems in which relatively centrist parties competed for voter support. The norms of western journalism do not describe what journalists do, of course. Norms are idealizations of what perfect agents do in perfect situations. Sometimes, if conditions are amenable, they are useful tools for thinking through problems and for encouraging, enticing, and exhorting. If conditions are not amenable, common sense tells us that the very same norms can be quite mischievous. So, for instance, the norm of balancing points of view, a common form of objectivity, is helpful when competing parties are relatively commensurable, but becomes evil if the views being balanced are, say, black nationalists and white supremacists in a society characterized by racial dominance. It also makes no sense for a journalist to try to balance points of view if the news system itself is not consolidated enough to provide some way of coordinating points of view. Likewise, the norm of independence makes no sense if journalists do not have some measure of occupational independence to support their prescribed intellectual independence. Ironically, in the West, journalists are often promised the independence to report critically on state actors but denied the independence to report critically on actors, no matter how powerful, in the private sector. This gives rise to the spectacle of a newspaper like the *Chicago Tribune* in the first decade of the 21st century congratulating itself on its hard-hitting coverage of a corrupt governor while its own ownership performed bizarre corrupt acts on its shareholders and employees. A critic can be forgiven for dismissing ‘independence’ as a mystification.

The export of western norms seemed especially stupid to many in the Cold War era. Western norms seemed particularly ill-suited to doing journalism in a situation of persistent north-south inequality, for example. Superpower conflict and global structural inequalities called forth different models of journalism.

A series of counter-hegemonic models pushed back against western norms. What Schramm (Siebert et al., 1956) called the ‘Soviet Communist’ theory of the press has often stood in for every counter-hegemonic model in discussions in the USA, and Schramm’s analysis of it in *Four Theories of the Press* has elements of caricature, to put it mildly. But the norm of self-criticism in notions of journalistic professionalism in state-sponsored or party-sponsored journalism can be thought of as analogous to the norm of objectivity, involving as it does an idealized version of independent criticism by an empowered news worker. If the western norm fantasizes the presence of a supervising public intelligence,

this notion of self-criticism similarly imagines an emergent supervising socialist public. Self-criticism, like objectivity, can be reckoned as an ameliorative practice, making the exercise of power more responsive without challenging power itself. It can also be dismissed as a mystification. Similarly, notions of ‘development journalism’ substituted an emergent democratic society for an actually existing public, and western critics likewise dismissed development journalism as a way of justifying autocratic press controls. In counter-hegemonic journalisms like these, journalists did their jobs well if they served publics-to-be. Such normative models make sense in systems that provide the material conditions for journalists to meaningfully try to live up to them.

Any normative model will include an element of fantasy. Western hegemonic journalism has been especially crippled in its relations with other journalisms by the inability to see the fantasy in its own model and an accompanying inability to distinguish among the fantasies in other models, treating them all as equally noxious. In the 1970s and 1980s, in the long controversy over the movement for a new world information and communication order, every voice raised in criticism of the existing system was cast in US news reports as proposing licensing or censorship (International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, 1980; Nordenstreng and Schiller, 1979), as if development journalism, Marxism, and social democracy were all simply versions of ‘the Authoritarian Theory of the Press’ (Siebert et al., 1956).

The end of journalism’s high modern moment

Despite its own imagined ‘twilight struggle’ with authoritarianisms of the left and right, western hegemonic journalism has been crippled not by its ‘others’ but by changes in its own infrastructure. In 1964, Marshall McLuhan wrote, ‘The classified ads (and stock market quotations) are the bedrock of the press. Should an alternative source of easy access to such diverse daily information be found, the press will fold’ (1964: 186). That began to happen in the 1980s, with free distribution weekly newspapers eating into the dailies’ monopoly on classifieds. The process accelerated with the arrival of web-based services.

More is involved here than the fate of the daily newspaper as a kind of enterprise. At stake is the model of journalism that was built in part on the daily newspaper form, and in part on other equally challenged monopolistic channels – the wire services, for instance, and state-authorized broadcasting services. The gates that the gatekeepers kept are coming down, and the authority of the gatekeepers is coming down with them.

The erosion of hegemonic journalism promises to undermine the coherence of the mechanisms that generated legitimacy for democratic governments. Public opinion is one key mechanism. High modern journalism was an effective if distorted means of representing the public, in part because it provided a common set of facts that citizens were presumed to gather around. If that journalism brought citizens together in news spaces like the pages of the daily newspaper, the network age invites them to disperse.

The hegemonic model of western journalism depends for its vitality on an infrastructure that allows for the creation of something that can be convincingly called ‘the news of the day’. It is because journalists are recognized as setting the agenda (McCombs and Shaw, 1972, 1993) for the news of the day that they are required to be professional and

responsible. The network environment disables that infrastructure. If the news of the day can be different for each individual, as the network media promise, then the notion of the news of the day no longer generates the kind of authority that journalism requires.

In the West, this has meant the breakdown of the bright line between journalism and other news practices. Tabloid journalism in the West began migrating from the periphery to the center in the 1980s, as a series of non-digital events gave it some upward mobility. These included the rise of cable and satellite television, with the accompanying breakdown of state monopolies in broadcasting, the abandonment of working-class readers by broadsheet dailies, the rise of talk radio and 24-hour news and sports shows, and the increased recognition of subaltern and minority groups and cultures that had been excluded or occluded by the older forms of the news of the day. Dan Hallin (1994) pronounced the end of journalism's high modernism before the web had had a chance to do much of anything about it.

This has been tremendously liberating for many, even as it has alarmed quite a few in the West and especially in the USA. North American critics fear the end of journalism altogether, though most qualify that by saying 'we weren't all that crazy about the mainstream media in the first place' (McChesney and Nichols, 2010). Certainly the many populations – women, racial and ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians – who were not represented by journalists as members of the public or who appeared in the news primarily as social pathologies have good reason to laugh off this alarm over the demise of journalism.

Nor does the rest of the world see the urgency in this sense of apocalypse. In most of the world, and especially in the developing world, the rise of new media forms of news has coincided with the rise, not the decline, of old media. In Asia overall, for example, paid newspaper circulation increased 16 percent in the five-year period from 2006 to 2010 (WAN-IFRA, 2011). In most of the world, news media, both old and new, are together entering a great age of seeking out new audiences.

Hegemonic western journalism came into existence at a point when the daily newspapers in western countries achieved penetration of the great bulk of working-class readers. No news media form in the West can now claim that level of distribution. Perhaps, as a result, no clear contender for the next hegemonic journalism, the next prevailing discipline of news, has appeared. The opening of the news environment can be credited with happy developments in some parts of the world – the contagion of political awakenings in autocratic countries in the past two years owes a lot to new news practices. But Twitter revolutions, if they do exist (I don't know), are unlikely to be the infrastructure or the animating fantasy of new normative structures, of a new hegemonic journalism, because they do not light up the mass of the citizenry the way that daily newspapers once did in the West.

What was journalism good for?

I have commented elsewhere that the main thing to regret about the demise of hegemonic journalism is that it's not there to piss on any more (Nerone, 2009b). James Curran (2010) inaccurately calls this remark 'gleeful', though maybe he meant that it gave him some glee. I hope it did.

For years, journalism has been failing to do its appointed task, which is to discipline the presentation of news. Supposedly, because of journalism, 'serious' people will be forced to reckon with the same set of facts and ideas, and these facts and ideas will be the tools by which serious people can deliberate and then govern themselves. It was when the news media acquired the power to determine what facts and ideas would be presented to serious people that hegemonic western journalism was invented. Even though media owners had acquired 'power without responsibility' (Curran and Seaton, 2009), they proclaimed that they had in fact assumed responsibility for stewarding the public sphere, and they asked the public to believe that they had given their news workers the autonomy and independence to do this – to be the eyes and ears of the public, to represent the public in open encounters with power. This was a fantasy. But fantasies do their work in the world, and when this one worked well, it allowed journalists to claim autonomy from both the state and their own employers. Enough great journalists did enough good journalism to enforce something you could call the regulative fiction of public intelligence.

The regulative fiction of public intelligence holds that there will be consequences for dishonesty. If a leader lies, or if a leader manipulates facts and arguments, an intelligent supervising public will hold him or her accountable. It is this regulative fiction that animates all those movies where a source struggles mightily to give a revelation to a news organization. The climax occurs with the moment of publication. Everything that follows is afterglow, and does not even have to be spelled out, because public accountability is so automatic. Public intelligence has always been at least in part a fiction, but it has been strongly regulative at times in the past, and it has been so in part because of the power of journalism to discipline the news.

The fiction of public intelligence has rarely worked well for those lacking power in a society. Their facts and ideas, however compelling or reasonable in retrospect, rarely compelled serious people to worry about judgment until moments of political change. Because hegemonic journalism has rarely worked for the powerless (Fraser, 1992), it is hard to be especially saddened by its weakening.

Is it better to have a bad umpire than to have no umpire at all? In the past, one could count on journalism to steward some kind of common sense on matters on which experts had achieved some sort of consensus. Sometimes this consensus remains unassailable – cigarettes do cause cancer – and sometimes this consensus represents what C. Wright Mills called 'crackpot realism' (1956) – as in all the US assessments of its reasons for the war in Vietnam. Still, there were some rules. In the USA today, there really are no rules. Nonsense about the economic results of tax cuts, which no respectable economist would endorse, nonsense about climate change which no climate scientist untainted by corporate funding would endorse, find their way into public discourse without fear of the retribution of either hegemonic journalism or an intelligent public, in large part because the scientists of the media system and its audiences have removed much of the mystery from the working of public opinion (contra Donsbach, 2006).

In a world where power is distributed evenly, umpires might be unnecessary. Power is hardly distributed evenly in our world, so the powerless could use the kind of umpire that hegemonic journalism promised. But, in our sinful world, actually existing umpires are likely to be the tools of the powerful. Rules will be enforced capriciously, and some

people will always be confident that they can break the rules with impunity. Hegemonic journalism didn't always deserve scorn, and in the hands of strong, inventive journalists, it still can be a beautiful and scary thing. But it can't be counted on to level the playing field. The smart journalists always have known this, and always have winked when invoking norms.

It remains to be seen what of this powerful tradition will be recuperated in the new news environment. Journalisms are never invented out of whole cloth; they are always patchworks of older traditions. Much of the tradition of hegemonic journalism, including its professions of populism and its deference to the intelligence of the people, can be useful. It is hard to imagine a journalism of any value that does not include some version of these elements. Beyond the stupid normativity that automatically condemns as authoritarian any medium or journalist that lacks what western hegemonic journalism has declared to be real independence, there remains much in the normative culture of the press that might support journalists in difficult situations. In systems in which journalists look for the ideological resources to support a vigorous critique of concentrations of power and abuses of authority, the norms of western journalism can be inspirational, but not if treated with too much reverence.

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